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ARTICLES
OUR CHILDREN: KIDS OF QUEER PARENTS & KIDS
WHO ARE QUEER: LOOKING AT SEXUAL MINORITY
RIGHTS FROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
Ruthann Robson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the conservative right's rhetoric in the realm of minority
sexualities has focused on children.' Drawing on themes of disease
and seduction, Christian fundamentalists have portrayed gay men
and lesbians as predators who target children, hoping to "seduce
them into a life of depravity and disease."2 As Jeffrey Weeks noted
many years ago, it was no accident that Anita Bryant called her
anti-homosexual campaign "Save Our Children, Inc."3 The United
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. The author's books include
Sappho Goes to Law School and Lesbian (Out)Law, and she has published numerous articles
on lesbian legal theory. The author expresses her appreciation to CUNY School of Law
Professional Development Fund for subsidizing the work of research assistants Donna
Canfield and Pavita Krishnaswamy and to S.E. Valentine for her comments.
1 See Herma Hill Kay, Symposium on Law in the Twentieth Century.- From the Second Sex
to the Joint Venture.- An Overview of Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States
During the lentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2091 (2000) (stating that "children and
the traditional family are the focal point around which conservatives rally to implement their
call for a return to 'family values,"' and that "the religious conservative critique of twentieth-
century family life seems to suggest that ... homosexuals in search of social approval of
alternative lifestyles ... threaten to destroy the sanctuary once provided by the father-
dominated, home-centered, mother-dependent, traditional family").
2 DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 78-
79 (1997). Professor Herman notes the similarity of this disease and seduction discourse to
anti-Semitic discourses associating Jews with disease, filth, urban degeneration, and child-
stealing. Ad. at 79; see also MICHAEL BRONSKI, THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE: SEX, BACKLASH,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY FREEDOM 112 (1998) ("While all studies show that physical and
sexual abuse of children is far more likely to occur within the heterosexual biological family,
the fear of the homosexual molester is persistent and powerful.").
3 See JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: MEANINGS, MYTHS AND MODERN
SEXUALITIES 224 (1985) (observing that the "guardians of morality may have given up hope of
changing adult behavior, but they have made a sustained effort to protect our young, whether
from promiscuous gays, lesbian parents or perverse pornographers").
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States Supreme Court implicitly considered the issue of whether
gay men should have contact with children with its recent decision
in a case involving the Boy Scouts of America.4 In the family law
arena, adoption and custody of children remain concerns of
conservative legal writers, and one conservative law professor has
recently argued that "homosexual parenting" is dangerous to
children.5
In composing their anti-gay rhetoric in terms of child protection,
conservatives have inaccurately grouped children into a monolithic
category, often excluding the real interests of two specific classes of
children: children of sexual minority parents and minors who are
themselves lesbian, gay, transgendered, or bisexual.6 First, the
conservative right's rhetoric has monolithically constructed the
children of sexual minority parents as victims in need of rescue.7
4 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2000) (noting the Boy Scouts
organization maintains that "homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to
instill"). In considering whether forcing the Boy Scouts to include a gay scoutmaster "would
significantly affect the Boy Scouts' ability to advocate public or private viewpoints" that are
protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that the "application of New
Jersey's public accommodations law to require that the Boy Scouts accept [a gay man] as an
assistant scoutmaster runs afoul of the Scouts' freedom of expressive association." Id. at
2452, 2455. This.decision reversed a decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, where a
concurring justice noted that the case raised the "pernicious stereotype" of homosexuals as
child molesters, but that the "myth that a homosexual male is more likely than a heterosexual
male to molest children has been demolished." Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196,
1243 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring), rev'd 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
1 See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997
U. ILL. L. REv. 833, 837-38 & n.12 (expressing concern that "the extension of parental rights
to nonbiologically related homosexuals who wish to assume parental status (custody,
visitation, adoption, foster care, etc.)" would result in "the elimination of consideration of
homosexual behavior by a parent or prospective parent as a factor in parenting cases
(disputes over custody, visitation, etc.) and legal endorsement of the equivalence of
homosexual parents to heterosexual parents"); see also id. at 852-67 (discussing potential
dangers arising from homosexual parenting, such as children living with homosexual people
developing homosexual interests and lacking the "strengths and attributes" that are
contributed by parents of different genders).
6 1 prefer the term "sexual minorities" because it is both inclusive of lesbians, gay men,
transgendered persons, and bisexuals and because it emphasizes their minority status in a
world of heterosexuality and gender conformity. At times, however, this term becomes
unwieldy, and I resort to the term "queer," which is inclusive, even if suffering from faults
ranging from being offensive to being trendy. When terms such as "gay," "lesbian," or "gay
and lesbian" are used, they are meant specifically.
7 See Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261, 285
(1995) (quoting a conservative group's view of the homosexual movement as 'aggressively
propos[ing] radical changes in social behavior, religion, morality and law"' and marriage and
the family as 'the most effective institutions for the rearing of children,"' leading to the
group's conclusion that 'homosexuality is preeminently a concern about the vulnerabilities of
the young"' (quoting Colloquy, The Homosexual Movement- A Response by the Ramsey
Colloquium, 41 FIRST THINGS 15-21 (1994), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9403/articles/homo.html)); Micah R. Onixt, Note, Romer
v. Evans. A Positive Portent of the Future, 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 593, 617 n.190 (1997) (noting a
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These children are presumably akin to abused children who will
suffer more from contact with their parents than from a deprivation
of their parents; any love such children have for their parents is
presumptively overwhelmed by the assumed disapproval such
children would have of their parents' sexuality.8
Second, the conservative right's rhetoric has excluded minors who
are themselves sexual minorities, even while conservatives fear that
children will become sexual minorities by exposure to gay, lesbian,
bisexual, or transgendered adults.9 Regardless of what causes
people to become sexual minorities, the conservatives' tactic of
hostility towards such people harms children and adolescents who
are-or who may become-sexual minorities.
At its most basic level, my argument is that we-those of us who
are members of a sexual minority-must continue to take
conservative group, Colorado for Family Values (CFV), asserts that children would be
unhappy victims of homosexual marriages if these unions were allowed).
8 Cl Wardle, supra note 5, at 864-66 (observing that "homosexual-parenting-affirming
studies," which emphasize homosexual parents' ability to love, care for, and raise children
while de-emphasizing those parents' homosexuality, "pose[] a comparison between
incomparable considerations-between a potentially positive parenting quality on one hand
and a potentially negative parenting quality on the other-and speculates in the abstract that
having the positive is more important than avoiding the negative"). The author further points
out that the "sexuality of the parent includes some serious risk factors that are just as
important to child welfare as positive factors such as nurturing." Id. at 866.
9 See Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle.- Morality, Social Science,
and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 287 (1998) (noting that Wardle
espouses a social constructionist theory that sexual orientation is not innate, but, rather,
determined by one's social environment, under which the "possibility [exists] that parents'
sexual orientation plays an important role in determining the sexual orientation of their
children"); Macedo, supra note 7, at 291-92 (exploring the possibility that "political equality
for homosexuals will ... harm the young" by discussing E.L. Pattullo's argument that public
censure of homosexual practices will turn 'young waverers"' away from sexual minority
lifestyles and back towards heterosexuality); Wardle, supra note 5, at 855-57 (noting that"social science research.., does suggest that there are some particular and unique potential
risks to children raised by active homosexual parents"); David S. Dooley, Comment, Immoral
Because They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong- Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of
Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 396 (1989-1990) (observing
that "courts fear that exposing [a] child to the gay parent's homosexuality might cause the
child to be sexually disoriented"). But see S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985)
(finding no evidence that an infant boy's exposure to his lesbian mother would increase the
likelihood of his becoming homosexual); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (rejecting the appellant's argument that exposing her two boys to their homosexual
father may cause them to become homosexual, and taking judicial notice that, while the
causes of homosexuality are elusive, most experts agree that it is not caused by contact with a
homosexual parent); Wardle, supra note 5, at 852-56 (conceding that the "sympathetic
orientation and methodological bias" of social scientific studies tending to demonstrate that
children of homosexual parents are more likely to become homosexual renders such studies
unreliable); David P. Russman, Note, Alternative Families.: In Wose Best Interests, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31, 58 (1993) (stating that "[a]lthough some courts fear that children of
gay parents will become gay themselves, little evidence suggests that a parent's sexual
orientation influences that of the child").
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responsibility for our children. Part II of this article considers the
children to whom we are biologically related, the children we would
adopt, and the children with whom we live. 0 Part III of this article
addresses the minors who are presently sexual minorities or who
may be in the future.1 ' In both cases, we must ensure that our
children are not damaged by the law.
II. THE BEST INTEREST OF OUR CHILDREN
Depriving a child of the continued care of his or her sexual
minority parent, based on parental sexuality, harms children,
despite any court's findings that such a deprivation is in the "best
interest of the child." The established standard in custody disputes
between parents, the "best interest of the child" test, 2 has devolved
into several different approaches regarding parental sexuality.13
10 See infra Part II (discussing the "best interest of the child" standard, and arguing that
the standard is often a ruse for discrimination against homosexuals, that such decisions
violate constitutionally protected family relationships, and that society has entered a
watershed period with respect to our perception of children).
11 See infra Part III (discussing difficulties facing homosexual adolescents, particularly in
academic environments, and how different jurisdictions have responded to teenagers'
attempts to bring homosexual awareness to their respective schools and curricula).
12 See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 433 N.Y.S.2d 693, 693 (App. Div. 1980) (mem.) ("The best
interest of the child involved must govern in the adjudication of custody." (citation omitted));
Berard v. Berard, 749 A.2d 577, 579 (R.I. 2000) ("It is well-settled that the best interests of
the child remain the 'lode-star principle' for determining child custody awards."); Price v.
Price, 541 A.2d 79, 81 (Vt. 1987) (stating that both Vermont common law and state legislation
used the best interest of the child standard to determine custody); see also David M.
Rosenblum, Comment, Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1665,
1665 (1991) (asserting that courts "overwhelmingly apply" this standard when making
custody determinations). Rosenblum also notes that the "best interest of the child" test is
"highly problematic" because "judges often inject their biases and prejudices about societal
norms and morality under the guise of the 'best interest' of the child." Id. at 1666.
13 As Rosenblum notes,
Courts making custody determinations differ with respect to the standards and tests
applicable when one parent is homosexual. Several courts have held that a parent's
homosexuality may be an absolute bar to his or her custody rights. Other courts apply a
conclusive presumption of unfitness, and find that a person's status as a gay man or
lesbian woman directly contradicts his or her status as a parent. Some courts, rather
than applying a conclusive presumption, nevertheless require gay and lesbian parents to
rebut the presumption that homosexuality renders them unfit to raise their children.
Rosenblum, supra note 12, at 1669-70 (citations omitted); see also Russman, supra note 9, at
42-55 (discussing the various approaches to homosexual parental fitness in custody disputes
between homosexual parents and heterosexual parents, heterosexual non-parents, or the
state). While I have noted elsewhere that there were three approaches, (see RUTHANN
ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAw: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 130-31 (1992) (noting there
are three approaches to ascertaining the parental fitness of a homosexual: first, treating
homosexuality as a per se disqualification; second, the "middle ground" approach, which
presumes that exposure to a gay lifestyle will harm children even though parental
homosexuality is not inherently harmful; and, third, the "nexus approach," by which living
with a homosexual parent is considered to be in a child's best interest unless the parent's
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Spanning the continuum, a court may decide that a parent's sexual
minority status is a per se disqualification of custody or that
parental sexuality is irrelevant. 14  Between these two poles is the
nexus approach, which requires the court to find a relationship
between parental sexuality and harm to the child.15 Under the
homosexuality is shown to actually harm the child)), in accordance with the accepted views,
(see, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SuSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 830-31 (1998) (noting that the "emerging consensus" of courts use the nexus
approach)), I believe it is important to add a fourth-and, I would argue, the only
acceptable-approach: that of irrelevance.
14 See In re J. S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 94-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (noting that,
although depriving a parent of visitation rights solely on the basis of parental homosexuality
would constitute "unjustified discrimination," the court restricted parental visitation rights on
the basis of the father's homosexual conduct, purportedly in the child's "best interest").
Compare, G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (awarding custody of a
preschool-age boy to his heterosexual father instead of his homosexual mother, even though
the mother's household was superior with respect to physical comfort), and L. v. D., 630
S.W.2d 240, 243-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a Missouri trial court did not err in
observing that homosexuality was not entitled to constitutional protection, and that
homosexuality was a crime of "[dleviate sexual intercourse"), with Bezio v. Patenaude, 410
N.E.2d 1207, 1215-16 (Mass. 1980) (accepting expert testimony that parental sexual
orientation was "irrelevant" to parental capability, and finding a "total absence of evidence
suggesting a correlation between the mother's homosexuality and her fitness as a parent"),
and Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (reaffirming that "a parent's life-
style, standing alone, is insufficient ground for severing the natural bond between a parent
and a child"), and In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983) (en banc)
(noting that homosexuality is not a per se bar to visitation rights), modified 718 P.2d 7, 8
(Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
15 See Dooley, supra note 9, at 396 ("[U]nder the nexus approach, the court requires proof
that the parent's homosexuality has or will adversely affect the child before custody can be
denied. Only in this approach does the court rely on the evidence, rather than on
presumption, to determine the parental capabilities of each parent." (citation omitted)). See
also, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985) (holding that a lesbian mother's
sexual orientation bore no negative impact upon an infant child's development, which would
have justified awarding custody to a heterosexual father); In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 287, 289-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (stating "a parent is not unfit, as a matter of law,
merely because he or she is homosexual," and finding no connection between a gay father's
lifestyle and religious practices and undesirable behavior in his child); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d
1256, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (noting a lack of evidence suggesting that a
lesbian mother's homosexuality will adversely affect her daughters, as well as the strong
likelihood that exposure to their lesbian mother will benefit the children by making them
more tolerant and accepting of the differences of others); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983,
986-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting three arguments-that exposure to homosexual father
would trigger homosexuality in two young boys, the likelihood of the boys contracting AIDS
from their father, and a desire to shield the boys from the "'slings and arrows of a
disapproving society"'-in sustaining the trial court's decision to award visitation rights to the
father); Vicki Parrott, Note, The Effect on the Child of a Custodial Parent's Involvement in an
Intimate Same-Sex Relationship-North Carolina Adopts the 'Nexus Test" in Pulliam v.
Smith, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 131, 132 (1996) (stating that after the Pulliam decision, North
Carolina courts could not find adverse effects on a child based solely on "the judge's opinion,
speculation and conjecture"). But see T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (rejecting the per se approach to determining parental unfitness, but nevertheless
finding a nexus between a lesbian mother's homosexual conduct and adverse effects on the"morality" and "well-being" of her children).
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"true" nexus approach, the burden of persuasion is allocated so that
there must be proof that parental sexuality will have an adverse
impact on the child. 16  Nonetheless, some courts presume adverse
impact, demanding that the sexual minority parent prove an
absence of harm to the children. 7
In all of these approaches, except for the irrelevance approach,
the courts construe the sexual minority parent as a potential cause
of harm to the child.' 8  In fact, much greater harm is caused by
judicial decisions that deprive a child of the care and companionship
of his or her parent. In the notorious situation of Sharon Bottoms
and her son Tyler, the Virginia Supreme Court deprived Sharon
Bottoms of custody because of her lesbianism. 9 In doing so, the
16 See, e.g., S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 879 (holding that there was no presumption of parental
unfitness based on sexual conduct, and that "[c]onsideration of a parent's conduct is
appropriate only when the evidence supports a finding that a parent's conduct has or
reasonably will have an adverse impact on the child and his best interests"); M.P., 404 A.2d at
1259 (noting that, in custody disputes, the party seeking modification of custody orders "hears
the burden of showing sufficient changed circumstances so as to require modification," and,
thus, a heterosexual father bears the burden of demonstrating that a lesbian mother's
homosexual conduct constitutes "changed circumstances" sufficient to warrant change of
custody orders); see also Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 985 (noting that "an irrebuttable presumption
[of parental unfitness based on sexual activity] offends.., constitutional standards"); Parrott,
supra note 15, at 132 (noting the court in Pulliam determined that "a court cannot conclude
that a child is adversely affected by a parent's involvement in an intimate same-sex
relationship, unless the moving party produces evidence that 'the conduct has or will likely
have a deleterious effect on the children"').
17 See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513-14 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that
Arkansas courts entertained a presumption that "illicit sexual conduct on the part of the
custodial parent is detrimental to the children" and that the trial court determined that
"homosexuality is generally socially unacceptable"). Professor Julie Shapiro calls this a
standard of "permissible determinative inference." Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct- How
the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 639-41 (1996).
18 See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (finding that a burden will be placed on a
child due to the social "condemnation" of her father's homosexual relationship); see also
Shapiro, supra note 17, at 644-45 (noting that a finding of harm is often justified by an
assumption of societal bias against homosexuality). This bias, and the resulting
stigmatization of the child, is itself seen as "harm" to the child. Id. at 645.
19 See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) [hereinafter Bottoms 1A (stating
that "living daily under conditions stemming from active lesbianism practiced in the home
may impose a burden upon a child"). The trial court decision and subsequent appeals
attracted national media attention and inspired several periodical articles. See, e.g., Amy D.
Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms.- The Lesbian Mother and the Judicial Perpetuation of Damaging
Stereotypes, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 341 (1995); Peter Nash Swisher & Nancy Douglas Cook,
Bottoms v. Bottoms: In Whose Best Interest? Analysis of a Lesbian Mother Child Custody
Dispute, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 843 (1995-96); Joseph R. Price, Comment, Bottoms III.-
Visitation Restrictions and Sexual Orientation, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 643 (1997); B.
Drummond Ayres, Jr., Judge's Decision in Custody Case Raises Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
1993, at A16; Debbie Howlett, Judge Rules Lesbian "unfit"mother, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 1993,
at IA; Elizabeth Kastor, The Battle for the Boy in the Middle," Little Tyler's Mom is a Lesbian,
so Grandma Got to Take Him Away, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1993, at C1, available at 1993 WL
2096263.
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court had to overcome the constitutional doctrine of parental
autonomy recognized by the Supreme Court for almost a century,
because the person seeking custody was not Tyler's father-a man
who had abdicated any responsibility for the child-but Tyler's
grandmother. ° As a grandparent, Sharon Bottoms' mother, Pamela
Kay Bottoms, was a classic third party without any recognized
claim to custody absent unusual circumstances.2' In a third party
custody challenge the court would not even reach the best interest
of the child test without first overcoming an initial hurdle, such as
parental unfitness or abandonment.22 The trial judge predicated the
finding of unfitness on Sharon Bottom's lesbianism, stating that,
The mother, Sharon Bottoms, has openly admitted in this
court that she is living in an active homosexual relationship.
The amount of attention devoted to Bottoms might lead one to believe it was an aberration.
However, the courts of Mississippi confronted a similar situation. In White v. Thompson, 569
So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1990), paternal grandparents sought custody of their grandchildren on the
grounds that the mother was an unfit parent. Id. at 1182. The bulk of the testimony
concerned the mother's lesbian relationship, which prompted the trial court to find the
mother "unfit, morally and otherwise, to have custody of her children." Id. at 1183. On
appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, the mother argued the trial court's finding was
impermissibly predicated solely on her lesbianism. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court
finessed the issue of her sexuality, deciding not to reach the issue of whether lesbianism alone
was sufficient to render a parent unfit, stating that, although
the predominant issue in this case seems to have been Mrs. White's lesbian relationship,
and the chancellor may have relied almost entirely on this, we find that a review of the
entire record and the circumstances present ... shows that the chancellor's decision that
Mrs. White was an unfit mother, morally and otherwise, was not against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Id. at 1184. The circumstances included some testimony that the "children had not been
properly supervised," clothed or fed. Id. The mother testified that conditions at the trailer in
which she lived with her children "were a lot better' than when her husband, the
grandparents' son, had lived there. Id. at 1183. The dissenting justice in Wite began his
opinion by observing that any neglect of the children was "no more than one would expect to
find in any case where a twenty-four year old mother with but a high school diploma and no
independent means" was attempting to support her children. Id. at 1185 (Roberston, J.,
dissenting). However, such neglect was sufficient to satisfy the state standard for rebutting
the presumption of custody accorded to a legal parent. Id. at 1184 (stating that "[a] parent's
chosen manner of living may not take precedence over the well-being of the children
involved").
20 See Bottoms 11, 457 S.E.2d at 103, 105.
21 See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1976) (holding "[t]he State may
not deprive a parent of the custody of a child absent surrender, abandonment, persisting
neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary circumstances"); Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824,
827 (Va. 1986) (affirming an award of custody to a child's stepmother instead of his mother
that was based upon "extraordinary" circumstances); see also Ruthann Robson, Third Parties
and the Third Sex. Child Custody and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1385
(1994) (exploring the court's traditional view of the family unit of one mother and one father,
and the relegation of those not meeting this criteria to the lesser status of "third parties").
22 See Bottoms 1, 457 S.E.2d at 104 (recognizing the presumption of parental custody, but
stating that "it is rebutted when certain factors, such as parental unfitness, are established
by clear and convincing evidence").
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She admitted she is sharing a bedroom and her bed with
another, her female lover, whom she identified by name as
April Wade. Sharon Bottoms in this courtroom admitted a
commitment to April Wade, which as she contemplates will
be permanent, and as I understand her testimony, long
lasting if not forever.
She readily admits her behavior in open affection shown to
April Wade in front of the child. Examples given were
kissing, patting, all of this in the presence of the child. She
further admits consenting that the child referred to April
Wade, her lover, as to quote the words "Da Da. 23
The trial judge found that the "mother's conduct [was] illegal,"
rendering her "an unfit parent," and that, while he was cognizant of
the "presumption in the law in favor of the custody being with the
natural parent," "Sharon Bottoms' circumstances of unfitness" were"of such an extraordinary nature" as to rebut the presumption of
parental custody.24 The trial court granted visitation to Sharon
Bottoms on Mondays and Tuesdays, provided that it not "be in the
home shared with April Wade or in April Wade's presence. 25
Although this decision was reversed by the intermediate court of
appeals,26 the trial court's decision was affirmed by the Virginia
Supreme Court, which stated it would "not overlook" Sharon
Bottoms' lesbian relationship: "living daily under conditions
stemming from active lesbianism practiced in the home may impose
a burden upon a child by reason of the 'social condemnation'
23 Transcript of Hearing at 195-96, Bottoms v. Bottoms (Va. Cir. Ct. Henrico Co. 1993) (No.
CH93JA0517-00) (on file on with Albany Law Review).
24 Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 279-80 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) [hereinafter Bottoms 1;
see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361[A] (Michie 1996) ("If any person carnally knows in any manner
any brute animal, or carnally knows any male or female person by the anus or by or with the
mouth, or voluntarily submits to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a Class 6
felony ... ").
2r Bottoms 1, 444 S.E.2d at 280. After the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
custody, Sharon Bottoms petitioned for a modification of visitation. See Bottoms v. Bottoms,
No. 0589-98-2, 1999 WL 1129720, at *1 (Va. App. June 29, 1999). The trial court denied the
petition except to the extent that it extended the summer visitation from one week to two
weeks. Id. Sharon Bottoms appealed, contending that the trial judge's order that visitation
with her child shall occur outside the presence of her lover, April Wade, violated state law and
her constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the United
States Constitution. Id. The appellate court refused to consider the constitutional issues,
finding that they were not properly raised in the trial court, and affirmed the trial judge's
restrictive visitation as being within the judge's broad discretion. See id. at *2 (stating that
the standard to be used in determining visitation is the best interest of the child).
26 See Bottoms , 444 S.E.2d at 283-84 (Va. App. 1994) (noting that the trial court erred in
adopting "a per se approach in finding Sharon Bottoms to be an unfit parent without finding
that she engaged in conduct or exposed her son to conduct that would be harmful to him").
[Vol. 64
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attached to such an arrangement, which will inevitably afflict the
child's relationships with its 'peers and with the community at
large.' 27
The harm of social condemnation in the context of race has been
declared an unconstitutional consideration in custody
determinations. In Palmore v. Sidoti,28 the United States Supreme
Court declared that, although "[p]rivate biases may be outside the
reach of the law,... the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect. 29  Furthermore, judicial concern with social
condemnation of homosexuality is questionable, since it does not
attach any societal or peer disapproval to being raised by one's
grandmother rather than one's mother.30 Presumably, an argument
that the child might be teased for living with his grandmother
would not be taken seriously. The real basis of the decision is not
societal disapproval of lesbianism, but judicial disapproval of
lesbianism, which is buttressed by the court's reference to the
illegality of lesbian sexual practices under Virginia's sodomy law.'
The emphasis that both the trial court and the Virginia Supreme
Court placed on the family's private interactions, including the
displays of affection between Sharon Bottoms and her lover, the
integration of the lover into the household, and Sharon Bottoms'
lack of shame about her relationship,32 suggests that the real harm
27 BoltomsI, 457 S.E.2d at 108 (quoting Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985)).
28 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
29 Id. at 433. In Pa/more, a father sought to modify a prior judgment awarding custody of
his daughter to his former wife. Id. at 430. The father argued that the mother's cohabitation
with and marriage to a man of a different race constituted changed circumstances. Id. The
trial court awarded custody to the father based in part on the court's belief that the child
would face "'social stigmatization"' as a result of living in a mixed race home. Id. at 431. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, and awarded custody back to the mother. Id. at 434.
See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448, 450 (1985)
(applying the Palmore rule to reject an "irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded" in
an exclusionary zoning context).
30 This proposition is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
the decision of the trial court, finding that awarding custody of Tyler to the senior Mrs.
Bottoms would be in the child's best interest. See Bottoms 1,457 S.E.2d at 103-04, 108.
31 See id. at 108 (noting that the court had previously held that homosexuals are not per se
unfit parents, but that "[c]onduct inherent in lesbianism" is a felony in Virginia and, "thus,
that conduct is another important consideration in determining custody").
32 The attorney representing the grandmother, Pamela Kay Bottoms, called as his first
witness Sharon Bottoms, and, after establishing her identity as the child's legal mother and
the identity of his client as the child's grandmother, immediately focused his questions on
lesbianism:
Q: Now, in the juvenile court you stated that you are in a lesbian relationship with
whom?
A: April Wade.
Q: Now, for the record, would you tell me your definition of a lesbian relationship. What
does it mean?
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the courts envisioned for the toddler was not social condemnation,
but exposure to homosexuality, with the increased chance that the
child "will develop homosexual interests and behaviors."33  While
any link would be the result of the normalization of homosexuality
in the child's perspective and, thus, the removal of some of the
socially imposed terrors, some legal thinkers argue that the increase
in homosexuality is the consequence of a lack of "cross-gender
parenting."34  In Tyler's case, however, this lack of dual-gender
parenting is equally applicable to the household of Tyler's
grandmother. The senior Ms. Bottoms had excluded her current
boyfriend from her household on the advice of her attorney, given
Sharon Bottoms' history of complaints concerning sexual abuse
perpetrated by him.35
The belief that exposure to homosexuality breeds homosexuality
provokes several responses. The first, and, I believe, the correct
response, is a resounding "so what?" As a lesbian myself, I am
unwilling to engage in an argument that assumes that my sexual
desires are pathological. Others have argued, however, that social
science research does not support a correlation between being raised
by a lesbian or gay parent and becoming a sexual minority.36
A: It means two people of the same sex are together.
Q: In what way are they together?
A: In a relationship.
Q: Now, you say a "relationship," does that entail sex?
A: Yes.
Q: Hugging and kissing?
A: Yes.
Q: Sleeping in the same bed?
A: Yes.
Q: Now then, you're not at all ashamed of that relationship, is that correct?
A: No, sir.
Transcript of Hearing at 9-10, Bottoms v. Bottoms (Va. Cir. Ct. Henrico Co.) (No.
CH93JA0517-00) (on file with Albany Law Review).
33 Wardle, supra note 5, at 852 (asserting that "[t]he most obvious risk to children from
their parents' homosexual behavior suggested by the current studies relates to the sexual
development of the child").
34 Id. at 860-61 (arguing that a lack of heterosexual parenting can cause emotional damage
to children, "[flor example, the absence of a father in the home may result in a daughter
having trouble relating to men throughout her adult life").
35 See Bottoms I, 444 S.E.2d 276, 278-79 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that this history of
sexual abuse against Sharon Bottoms was her motivating factor in deciding to remove her son
from her mother's home). The Virginia Supreme Court more simply noted that the
grandmother's "boyfriend ceased living with her shortly before the juvenile court hearing, and
has not returned." Bottoms 1, 457 S.E.2d at 105.
36 For an excellent rehearsal of the social science research from a legal perspective, see
Ball & Pea, supra note 10, at 280-285, discussing studies used by Wardle to argue that
children raised by gays and lesbians risk becoming homosexual. For Wardle's response, see
Lynn D. Wardle, Flghting with Phantoms.- A Reply to Warring with Wardle, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 629, 629-31, concluding that courts should apply a rebuttable presumption in child
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Furthermore, a correlation would not prove causation; other factors
could explain any discrepancy. 37
In the context of the Bottoms litigation, any underlying belief that
the harm to the toddler in being raised by his mother would be his
eventual homosexuality is especially ironic: he is now in the
custody of the one person in the litigation with the proven track
record of raising a sexual minority, Sharon Bottoms' mother, Kay
Bottoms.
Bottoms is illustrative rather than unique. Countless children
have been removed from their sexual minority parents.38 In many
cases, sexual minority adults fought such removal in court, and the
reporters are filled with our defeats, as well as our more recent
successes. 9 In many other situations, lesbians and gay men did not
bring their cases to court, believing that to do so would be a fruitless
endeavor that would injure their children.4 ° Yet, whether we fought
support cases that a parent's homosexuality is not in the best interests of the child. See also
Susan Golombok & Fiona Tasker, Do Parents Influence the Sexual Orientation of Their
Children? Fndings from a Longitudinal Study of Lesbian Families, 32 DEV. PSYCHOL. 3, 8
(1996) (reporting that "the commonly held assumption that children brought up by lesbian
mothers will themselves grow up to be lesbian or gay is not supported" by a study of lesbian
and heterosexual families, and "there was no statistically significant difference between
young adults from lesbian and heterosexual family backgrounds with respect to sexual
orientation"); Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Families with
Children. Implications of Social Science Research for Policy, 52 J. SOcIAL ISSUES 29, 30
(1996) (concluding, from an overview of social science literature, that gay and lesbian parents
are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide a positive home environment).
31 See, e.g., Ball & Pea, supra note 10, at 286-288 (discussing heredity and a contemporary
atmosphere of tolerance as other factors influencing sexuality).
38 It seems the most frequent manifestation of this "removal" occurs when courts deny
custody or visitation based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d
733, 736-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that visitations restrictions were appropriate where
a sexual minority parent took a child to a "lesbian choir" and other gay-oriented activities);
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (denying visitation rights to a sexual
minority partner who had raised a child from infancy because she was not the biological or
adoptive mother and, therefore, "not a parent" for the purposes of the state's statute).
39 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1001 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1992)
(granting adoption to sexual minority parents, noting that "a child's best interest is not
predicated or controlled by parental sexual orientation"). But see Marlow, 702 N.E.2d at 737-
38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a restriction on a gay father's visitation rights by
prohibiting the father from taking his child to gay activist social gatherings"' was
appropriate).
40 As one lesbian poet has written:
Women ask: Why didn 'tyou-?
like they do of women who've been raped.
And I ask myself: Why didn't I? Why
didn't I run away with them? Or face
him in court? Or-
Ten years ago I
answered myself: No way for children to live.
Minnie Bruce Pratt, The Child Taken from the Mother, in CRIME AGAINST NATURE 24 (1990).
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or not, when our children were deprived of their parents-us-they
were seriously harmed.
In most cases, we assume that it is wrong to remove children from
their parents.' For example, one conservative legal writer decries
the cruel persecution of the Amish, whose children were "declared
wards of the state, removed from their homes, and placed in
institutions" because the parents refused to be assimilated into the
common culture.42 The writer is referring to the Amish in support of
his argument against compulsory assimilation,43  although his
argument is equally applicable to other persecuted groups, such as
Native Americans.4 For example, the United States Congress and
Supreme Court have recently admitted that the former removal of
Native American children from their parents in order to civilize the
children was a brutal mistake.4 5  Native American lesbian theorist
Beth Brant has explicitly made the connection between the forced
removal of indigenous children by the United States government in
the nineteenth century and a custody battle involving a lesbian
parent.46  The dominant regime removes the children of minorities
41 The exception to this general rule is for parental abuse and neglect, which is variously
phrased in different jurisdictions, and which allows the state to remove a child for his or her
protection. As in other areas of family law, however, definitions and applications of abuse
and neglect are culturally conditioned and historically contingent, as is evident in an
examination of cases involving corporeal punishment of children.
42 See Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability o/-Religious Inequality, 1996
BYU L. REV. 569, 575-76 (noting ways the state carries out "religious persecution under the
authority of education").
43 Id.
44 See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989) (noting that
"[s]tudies undertaken by the Association on American Indian Affairs in 1969 and 1974, and
presented [at] Senate hearings, showed that 25 to 35% of all Indian children had been
separated from their families and placed in adoptive families, foster care, or institutions").
For a discussion of the multiple paradoxes posed by fundamentalist objections to a liberal
education that exposes children to a variety of ideas, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, 'He Drew a
Circle that Shut Me Out"' Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal
Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 584-87 (1993), noting that "liberalism condemns
indoctrination but refuses to acknowledge its own reliance upon it."
45 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902 (1994) (stating that "the States, exercising their recognized
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies,
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural
and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families"); Choctaw Indians, 490
U.S. at 32-37 (noting that the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was in
response to concerns "over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian
tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of
Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement,
usually in non-Indian homes").
46 See BETH BRANT, A Long Story, in MOHAWK TRAIL 77, 77-79 (1985) (telling the parallel
stories of a Native American woman and a lesbian woman who had custody of their children
taken away and who were told "[iut [was] good for [the children]" and "it was in [the child's]
best interests").
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so that the children do not become like their parents: the Amish
children were removed so they would not be Amish adults, the
native children were removed so they would become unfamiliar with
native culture, and the children of sexual minorities are removed so
they will not become homosexuals.
In all of the above-mentioned situations, the constitutional rights
of the parents and of the children were violated. The Amish
emerged victorious from the fight for control of their children, the
results of which can be found in the United States Supreme Court
decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder4 Native American parents did not
have a similar constitutional victory in the courts. 8 However, the
practice of removing Native American children was finally
addressed by Congress, resulting in the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978.49 Meanwhile, the persecution of sexual minority parents by
47 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that compulsory education beyond the eighth grade
violated the First and Fourth Amendment rights of the Old Order Amish).
48 See, e.g., In re Cantrell, 495 P.2d 179, 181-82 (Mont. 1972) (affirming a district court
order removing a Native American child and awarding custody to the Department of Public
Welfare of Valley County, Montana); In re Adoption of Doe, 555 P.2d 906, 921-22 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1976) (finding that a Native American father had abandoned his child and granting
custody of the child to non-Native American adoptive parents, instead of the child's Native
grandfather, against the father's wishes). The court in Doe disregarded the argument
asserted by the father that he could not have abandoned his child under Navajo custom
because maternal grandparents traditionally assumed the responsibilities of raising children
if a Navajo father did not carry out parental duties. Id. at 920.
49 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994) (setting forth legislation intended "to protect the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian
children from their families"). For discussions of the history of forced child removal as the
genesis of the Act, see Patrice H. Kunesh, Transcending Frontiers: Indian Child Welare in
the United States, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 17, 22-24 (1996). The Act was described as "one
of the singular most important pieces of federal legislation recognizing tribes' sovereign rights
to protect the interests of their communities and their children." Id. at 33-34. See generally
Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer olHope. A Proposal to Keep the Indian Child Welare Act of 1978
Intact, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1997) (detailing the Act, analyzing the state courts'
application of the Act, and illustrating political pressures limiting implementation of the Act).
The removal of Native American children from their parents occurred by two different
methods. The earlier plan, administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, resulted in the
wholesale removal of children from their families and tribes and in their "education" in
boarding schools for eight years, during which time the children were not permitted to speak
their native language, wear native clothes, or keep their hair long. See B.J. Jones, In Their
Native Lands." The Legal Status olAmerican Indian Children in North Dakota, 75 N.D. L.
REV. 241, 247-48 & n.44 (1999) (noting that "federal policymakers targeted Indian children as
the agents of change in an era when Indian people were perceived as 'savages' who needed to
be rehabilitated and Christianized"); Kunesh, supra, at 21 (describing the federal
government's policy of attacking Native American familial bonds with education as "one of the
most pernicious Indian child removal methods"). The later removal policy was based on the
presumption that Native American children were abused and neglected. The claims were
often based on poverty or on cultural practices, such as extended kinship systems that viewed
parental responsibility differently from the dominant white culture. See id. at 23-24
(maintaining the reservation system itself created the dependence and poverty that was then
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child-removal is lessening in some states through judicial decisions,
usually based on judicial interpretations of state substantive law
rather than on constitutional grounds."
While parental constitutional rights are important, the
constitutional rights of the children, which are implicated when
children are removed from their parents, are important as well.
Discrimination against the children of sexual minority parents is
analogous to discrimination against the children of unwed parents.
The Supreme Court has decided more than thirty cases dealing with
illegitimate children.5 1  Most of these cases proceed from the
premise that it is constitutionally problematic to discriminate
against children based on conditions they cannot control.52 The
Court has measured various state provisions regarding illegitimate
children against the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution,
relying on the notion that the provisions make a quasi-suspect
classification. 3  When considering what government interests are
used against the Native Americans to take their children). The extent to which the state
welfare practices have been ameliorated is doubtful; as one recent commentator noted, "[a]n
Indian child in North Dakota is over eight times more likely to be placed in foster care than a
non-Indian child." Jones, supra, at 246 (explaining that this disproportionate foster care
placement prompted Congress to enact the Indian Child Welfare Act).
60 See, e.g., Pryor v. Pryor, 709 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (relying on precedent
to hold that "sexual orientation as a single parental characteristic is not sufficient to render
that parent unfit to retain physical custody of a child"); Hodson v. Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699,
701 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a "discreet homosexual relationship" is not a per se bar
to custody of a child); Paul C. v. Tracy C., 622 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (App. Div. 1994) (citing state
case law to hold that "[wihere a parent's sexual preference does not adversely affect the
children, such preference is not determinative in a child custody dispute").
51 See Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children" and Their Parents Before the United States
Supreme Court From Levy to Michael H.." Unlikely Participants in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1999) (citing all of the United States Supreme
Court cases decided between 1968 and 1989 involving unwed parents and their children).
52 The Weber Court expressed this view most eloquently:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation of
irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on
the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as
an unjust-way of deterring the parent.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (citation omitted). A few years
earlier, the Court noted that no action of the children was relevant to the case, and quoted
William Shakespeare's, King Lear, act 1, scene 2: "Why bastard, wherefore base?" Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 n.6 (1968).
53 See Jill Dinneen, Comment, Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati.- The Sirth Circuit Narrowly Construes Romer v. Evans, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
951, 962 (1999) (stating that "[o]ver the years, the Supreme Court found that
classifications.., based on illegitimacy and gender are quasi-suspect, and has applied the
developed levels of review to uphold or strike down challenged laws" (citations omitted)).
Dinneen notes that homosexuals have not obtained any level of protected status. Id. at 963.
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sufficient within the context of illegitimacy, the Court has rejected
the asserted interests of encouraging and strengthening marriage or
supporting traditional family life." However, illegitimacy
classifications have been upheld when the government interest
supporting the provisions' constitutionality has been related to the
proof of paternity.55
The Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence regarding the
children of unwed parents is applicable to the children of sexual
minority parents, children who likewise had no control over the
conditions of their birth. Neither the children of sexual minority
parents nor the children of heterosexual parents make a proper
category for Equal Protection classification because both interfere
with the fundamental right of intimate familial relationships
between children and their parents. The asserted state interests of
encouraging marriage and traditional family life are no more valid
when applied to discrimination against the children of sexual
minority parents than when applied to the children of unwed
parents. Furthermore, there is no other valid state interest-such
as problems relating to the proof of paternity-that could support
the governmental interest in discrimination. Thus, state laws and
practices that impose a higher burden on a child's right to maintain
an intimate familial relationship with a sexual minority parent
should be deemed an unconstitutional violation of the child's rights.
Shifting the focus to the child's interests, such as to the toddler
Tyler, instead of his mother, Sharon Bottoms, is consonant with the
orientation of family law toward the best interest of the child56 and
54 See e.g., N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 619-20 (1973) (quoting Weber
for the proposition that a statutory scheme intended to preserve family life cannot
constitutionally deny benefits to illegitimate children while granting them to legitimate
children); see also Weber, 406 U.S. at 175, (acknowledging a state's interest in protecting
'legitimate family relationships," but rejecting it as a compelling reason to discriminate
against illegitimate children).
55 The problems regarding proof of paternity became dispositive in Lalli v. Lalli 439 U.S.
259 (1978), in which the Court found the state's interest in the "just and orderly disposition of
property at death" was served by the statutory requirement that the father's paternity be
determined prior to his death in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 268, 275-76. Earlier, the Court,
in Kallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), deferred to Congressional judgment regarding the
exclusion of illegitimate children of men (but not women) from an immigration statutory
preference, citing the "serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity
determinations." Id. at 797, 799. Proof of paternity concerns may not be enough in some
circumstances. For example, the Court declared unconstitutional a Texas common law
practice denying illegitimate children the right to legal support from their fathers, despite the
Court's recognition of the "lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity." Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
56 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2073 (2000) (calling the best interest of the
child rule an "entirely well-known" standard). In fToxel, the Court explained that there is a
strong presumption that parents act in the best interest of their child, but that "there may be
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is apparent in such practices as unlinking visitation and child
support.57 Admittedly, asserting the constitutional interests of
children can be problematic. For example, although the child is
central in constitutional illegitimacy jurisprudence, the decisions
also balance the child's interests with parental rights, or allow the
child's rights to be encompassed by parental rights.5 8  Moreover,
although the Supreme Court has famously stated that the Bill of
Rights, in general, and the Fourteenth Amendment, in particular,
are not 'for adults alone,"' 59 juveniles are generally relegated to the
position of having lesser constitutional rights than adults, as the
constitutional developments in a minor's right to abortion amply
illustrate.60  The ambivalence of the United States towards the
circumstances in which a child has a stronger interest at stake" that may be more important
than an isolated right of the parents, at least where the parents act arbitrarily. Id.
17 See, e.g., Hodge v. Hodge, 507 F.2d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding the denial of visitation
rights is not justified if this is done only to punish the father for failure to pay child support);
Stewart v. Soda, 642 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that failure to pay child
support was not a proper reason to terminate visitation).
58 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983) (noting that, in evaluating the rights
of a parent and the best interest of a child, a relevant criterion is "the existence or
nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent and child"); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 383-84, 392-93 (1979) (finding the father of illegitimate children had an equal
protection interest in blocking the adoption of his natural children by the children's
stepfather).
59 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 42 (1967) (holding that due process requires the state to
appoint an attorney for indigent minors in juvenile delinquency proceedings that might result
in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is impaired); see also roxel,
120 S. Ct. at 2072 n.8 (citing precedent acknowledging "that children are in many
circumstances possessed of constitutionally protected rights and liberties").
60 The Court has decided numerous cases regarding a minor's restricted constitutional
right to abortion, and instituting the compromise of a judicial bypass procedure to guarantee
a minor's rights are not overborne by her parents. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S.
292 293-94 (1997) (reversing the Ninth Circuit's holding that a judicial bypass procedure was
too narrow to protect the minor's rights because bypass was limited to situations where
notification was not in the best interest of the child, but did not extend to scenarios where the
abortion itself was in the child's interest); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899
(1992) (rejecting a challenge to the requirement of the informed consent of one parent where
an adequate judicial bypass procedure was provided); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990) (finding that the state's bypass procedure met the requirements the
Court had previously established for parental consent statutes, but leaving open the question
of whether parental notification statutes required bypass procedures); Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1990) (upholding a forty-eight hour waiting period and a two-parent
notice requirement with a sufficient bypass procedure); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411,
413 (1981) (upholding a parental notice statute because, unlike consent, requiring notice did
not give the parent veto power over the minor's decision and, thus, no bypass was required);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (holding that a minor should be able to utilize a
mechanism for judicial bypass without first giving notice to her parents); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (rejecting a blanket provision requiring parental consent
because the state had no constitutional authority to give any third party, even a parent,
absolute veto power over a decision made by a patient and her doctor).
Relying on their state constitutions, supreme courts in California and Florida have held that
minors' rights to an abortion are co-extensive with adults. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of
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rights of children is demonstrated by this nation's unique failure to
ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.61
Conservatives argue that recognition of constitutional rights for
children is antithetical to family values.62  However, a more liberal
perspective advances the credible argument that children have a
constitutional right to maintain a relationship with "parent-like"
individuals 63 and further, that the Constitution should be amended
to include children, just as it was amended to protect the rights of
former slaves and to grant suffrage to women.6 Certainly, we are in
Pediatricians v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 816 (Cal. 1997) (concluding that the abortion decision
is a protected privacy interest "so central to the preservation of her ability to define and
adhere to her ultimate values regarding the meaning of human existence and life, and... is a
decision that cannot be postponed until adulthood'); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla.
1989) (explaining the Florida Constitution extends to "every natural person"). For an
argument that the Montana statute regulating a minor's access to abortion, held to be
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Lambert, violates the Montana state
constitution's explicit privacy provision, see Matthew B. Hayhurst, Comment, Parental
Notification of Abortion and Minors'Rights Under the Montana Constitution, 58 MONT. L.
REV. 565, 574, 586 (1997).
Interestingly, there has been no discernable litigation or scholarship concerning a minor's
right to have HIV-testing without parental notification or consent as a constitutional matter.
Perhaps this is because a large number of states statutorily authorize testing and treatment
for HIV and/or sexually transmitted diseases. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The Peculiar Place of
Adolescents in the HIVAIDS Epidemic: Unusual Progress & Usual Inadequacies in
'Adolescent Jurisprudence," 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 237, 261-62, nn.97-99 (1996) (noting that the
general requirement that children have parental consent prior to receiving health care has
some exceptions and that states are increasingly listing HIV testing among those exceptions);
cf William Adams, 'But Do You Have to Tell My Parents?" The Dilemma for Minors Seeking
HIV-Testing and Teatment, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 493, 495 (1994) (noting that, as of 1994,
only eleven states, by statute, allowed minors to consent for HIV testing). For a
comprehensive summary of state legislation related to HIV and AIDS as of 1998, see Staff of
Volume 8, State Statutes Dealing with HIV and AIDS: A Comprehensive State-by-State
Summary (1999 Edition), 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (1998).
61 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights:
Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1,
1 (1999) (noting this "U.N. Convention has been adopted by every nation in the world
community except the United States").
62 See id. at 2 ("[M]any conservatives reject the concept of rights for children as a threat to
family values."); see also Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric.- The
Constitutional Rights of Children, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L. J. 321, 322-23, 348 (1996) (arguing that,
although the recognition of the constitutional rights of children is important for children and
society, the 'cult of rights"' is misplaced in the context of family law and that "[p]arents-a
mother and a father-who are committed to their marriage can best protect children's
rights").
63 See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, The 7Fe that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to
Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 410 (1994)
(encouraging courts to recognize a "child's liberty interest in a child-parent relationship"
which would promote stable relationships that are beneficial to the child).
64 See Charles D. Gill, A Constitutional Amendment for Children, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING
POVERTY 273, 273 (1998) (suggesting that "using children's rights as a vehicle, as a political
strategy, may well be a double-barreled shotgun that can help children and alleviate poverty
with one pull of the trigger").
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the midst of a cultural and legal disagreement regarding our
understandings of children.65
Nevertheless, even if our notion of children's right to the
companionship of their parents, regardless of sexual orientation or
gender identification, is not grounded in the Constitution, we should
not allow the "best interest of the child" standard to function as a
hollow sentiment, deployed to validate discrimination against
sexual minority parents and their children. Such discrimination is
predicated on the fear that children of sexual minorities will become
sexual minorities. From a legal reform standpoint, the appropriate
strategy is to remove legal barriers and install legal safeguards that
will assist young people in surviving a "queer adolescence."
III. SURVIVING A QUEER ADOLESCENCE
"It's always open season on gay kids."66 Whether conservatives
proceed from an essentialist (biological and immutable) basis for
sexuality, a constructionist (psychological and environmental) basis
for sexuality, or some combination of the two,67 the message is one of
exclusion and hostility. Theorist and judge Richard Posner, for
example, discusses the different theories on the cause of
homosexuality, but argues that regardless of its cause,
homosexuality should be discouraged. 68 Regarding the theory that
the basis of homosexuality is biological, Posner states,
Maybe we should just be patient; science, which has worked
so many wonders, may someday, perhaps someday soon,
discover a "cure" for homosexuality .... [1If the hypothetical
cure for homosexuality were something that could be
administered---costlessly, risklessly, without side effects-
65 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood- Legal Models of Children and the Parent-
Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 347-50 (1997) (explaining how the law relies on two
different and simultaneously existing models with regard to children: a nineteenth-century
model of children within families and a late twentieth-century model of children as
autonomous individuals).
66 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET:
QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 69, 69 (Michael Warner ed., 1993).
67 See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 295 (1992) (noting that three theories as to
the cause of homosexuality are: 1) that homosexuality is biologically determined, 2) that it is
a choice of lifestyle, and, 3) that it is influenced by developmental factors, such as a child's
relationship with his parents).
68 See id. at 295-97 ("The more that homosexuality can be persuasively depicted as a
biologically determined condition like sickle-cell anemia or male pattern baldness, the less
sense it makes to place it under restrictions designed to protect children from succumbing to
its allures. If, however, it is merely a vicious choice of life-styles, it ought to be repressed as
firmly as possible.").
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before a child had become aware of his homosexual
propensity, you can be sure that the child's parents would
administer it to him, believing, probably correctly, that he
would be better off, not yet having assumed a homosexual
identity.69
Yet, as is made clear by the passage's continuation, Posner does
not fully subscribe to an immutable preference. According to
Posner, there is a possibility parents can prevent the "formation of
homosexual preference.., by discouraging gender-nonconforming
behavior at its outset (later is too late)," by not "condoning 'sissyish'
behavior in infancy."7 °
Whatever the genesis, the fact remains that many adolescents are
sexual minorities. When I was a teenager, we existed in a far less"gay-friendly" (though perhaps less conservative) era, and, long
before I was a teenager, there were sexual minority adolescents.
For one conservative law professor, however, preventing sexual
minority youth from existing (by preventing sexual minority parents
from parenting) is important because "[h]omosexual behavior ... is
associated with suicidal behavior, prostitution, running away from
home, substance abuse, HIV infection, highly promiscuous behavior
with multiple sex partners, and premature sexual activity."" This
logic argues for a stigmatizing regime and then concludes that the
results from the stigmatization prove the inadequacy of those being
stigmatized. Such circular reasoning would support an annihilation
of Native youth based on a finding that "Native Americans have the
highest suicide rate of any adolescent group in the country."72 This
logic also fails to address the legal and social conditions that make
alternatives such as suicide and other self-destructive behaviors
attractive. Nor can it account for the reality that the chances of
suicide, homelessness, or substance abuse, for a sexual minority or
sexually questioning adolescent, vary with the tolerance for sexual
variation within the home.7 3 The overwhelming majority of youths
69 Id. at 308.
70 Id. at 309. Supporting his advice that parents discipline an infant for displaying
"sissyish behavior" is Posner's underlying thesis: while a person's sexual preference is given,
not chosen, the decision to engage in a particular act is a rational choice made in light of
pertinent costs and benefits. Id. at 308-09.
71 Wardle, supra note 5, at 854 (citation omitted).
72 Kunesh, supra note 49, at 30.
73 See, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, The Penalties for Puppy Love.- Institutionalized Violence
Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 73"ansgendered Youth, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 429,
439-440 (1998) (relating both anecdotal and statistical evidence of the propensity for these
misunderstood youths to attempt suicide or be kicked out of their homes); Scott Hershberger,
et al., Predictors of Suicide Attempts Among Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth, 12 J.
20011
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who leave their homes do not go because they are ready to have
adult lives of independence and adventure; they are evicted or
constructively evicted by their parents or guardians because of the
adults' intolerance.74
Some parents have forced psychiatric treatment on their children
because of the minors' sexual variance. As Daphne Scholinski
relates, she spent four years institutionalized in a psychiatric
hospital, "sentenced to an adolescence spent surrounded by white
walls and lab coats-quite a punishment for a 14-year-old who was
showing the typical signs of growing up gay in a heterosexist
society."75  Her situationl is not unique.76  It is imperative that
parents not be legally permitted to institutionalize youth because of
sexual or gender identity.77 Moreover, "therapists" who engage in"conversion therapy," which attempts to change a person's sexual
ADOLESCENT RES. 477, 479 (1997) (discussing studies suggesting that sexual minority youth
who attempt suicide are less likely to have supportive friends and parents).
74 See Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Eric M. Dub6, Parental Reactions to Their Child's
Disclosure of Gay/Lesbian Identity, 47 FAM. REL. 7, 9 (1998) (noting some parents react to a
child's disclosure of sexual minority identity with rage, physical abuse, or ejection from the
home). As the Gay, Lesbian & Straight Teachers Network (GLSTN) reports, "19% of gay men
and 25% of lesbians report suffering physical violence at the hands of a family member[]...
11.5% of gay youth report being physically attacked by family members," and "26% of
adolescent gay males report having to leave home as a result of conflicts with their family
over their sexual orientation." Just the Facts: On Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Students and
Schools, at http://www.uncg.edu/edu/ericcass/diverse/docs/gayfacts.htm (last updated May 6,
1997) (reporting statistics on self-realization, school climate, the family, and anti-gay violence
and harassment). This is not to imply, however, that the majority of parents reject their
children upon disclosure of sexual minority status or behaviors. "Although parents often
react in a less than ideal fashion after learning of their child's same-sex attractions, limited
research indicates that most eventually arrive at tolerance or acceptance of their son's or
daughter's sexual orientation." Savin-Williams & Dub6, supra, at 7.
75 Daphne Scholinski, After- Wards, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1195, 1197 (1997).
76 See id. at 1196 (stating that "the United State's mental health system remains an
extremely hostile environment for [lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered] youth, who are
routinely viewed by child and adolescent psychiatrists as being 'emotionally disturbed' and in
need of aggressive psychiatric treatment 'to prevent adult homosexuality"' in spite of the fact
that the "American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its official list of
mental disorders in 1973").
77 For further discussion, see generally Miye A. Goishi, Unlocking the Closet Door.-
Protecting Children from Involuntary Civil Commitment Because of Their Sexual Orientation,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 1137 (1997), discussing the institutionalization of sexual minority youth
and proposing a reform of the psychiatric admissions process for sexual minority youth. Cf
Samuel M. Leaf, Note, How Voluntary is the Voluntary Commitment of Minors? Disparities in
the Treatment of Children and Adults Under New York's Civil Commitment Law, 62 BROOK.
L. REV. 1687 (1996) (discussing New York's procedures and proposing a revised voluntary
commitment statute that would afford due process protections for the growing number of
adolescents placed in psychiatric institutions by their parents for troublesome adolescent
behavior rather than for serious mental illness).
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identity, should be held legally liable and the practice should be
condemned by respectable psychological organizations.7"
Some parents who object to their children's sexuality turn to the
courts rather than to psychiatry for assistance, often with equally
destructive results. A parent can seek court intervention if a
teenager is sexually active. For example, in In re Lori M.,7 9 a
mother sought to have her child declared a "person in need of
supervision" under a New York statute.8 ° The fifteen-year-old child,
Lori, was associating with a twenty-one-year old lesbian.8" Lori was
fortunate in that the judge found her mature enough to express her
sexuality and denied the petition, even while admonishing Lori
that, because she was a minor, any sexual actions with an adult
could violate New York law.82 One could hope that Lori M. is not an
anomaly, 3 but although there are few reported cases in this area,
minority sexuality is certainly an area that can lead a parent to
juvenile court, resulting in a judgment adjudicating the sexual
minority adolescent as delinquent. As one commentator on female
78 For further discussion, see Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Perverts and Converts: Sexual
Orientation Conversion Therapy and Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 245, 249 (1999),
arguing that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be applicable to the
outrageous conduct involved when a conversion therapist's "sole aim ... is to eradicate
homosexuality," and that the American Psychiatric and Psychological Associations should
issue an unconditional ban on the practice. Cfl David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual
Orientation Conversion and the Limits o/Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297, 1345-
48, 1361-63 (1999) (discussing conversion therapy in epistemological terms and concluding
that at a minimum, informed consent is necessary).
79 496 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Fam. Ct. 1985).
80 Id. at 940; see N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 712(a) (McKinney 1999), amended by 2000 N.Y. Laws
596 (McKinney) (effective Nov. 1, 2001) (defining a person in need of supervisions as one who
is "incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of
parent or other lawful authority"); see also Jonathan C. Juliano, Detention oflPersons in Need
of Supervision: The Dilemma in Grounding the Flight of the Fleet-footed Status Ofender, 13
J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 95, 106-116 (1999) (discussing the legality of detention for persons in
need of supervision under section 720 of the Family Court Act).
81 LoriM., 496 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
82 See id. at 942-43 (noting that the child had "given a great deal of thought to her decision
and its possible ramifications," although she should be aware that because she is a minor "she
is not free to act entirely as she wishes"). The court also found that Lori's rights fell "within
the constitutionally protected zone of privacy." Id. at 942. See also N.Y. Penal Law § 130.40
(McKinney 1997), amended by 2000 N.Y. Laws 1 (providing that it is a Class E felony for a
person over twenty-one years of age to engage in "deviate" sex with someone younger than
seventeen).
83 As Colleen Sullivan notes in her discussion of this case, if Lori had been younger than
fifteen years of age, had expressed hostility to her mother for bringing the case, had stated
conclusively that she was a lesbian, or if there had been a different judge exercising his or her
broad discretion in a different manner, Lori could have been declared as a "person in need of
supervision" and remanded to state custody. See Colleen A. Sullivan, Kids, Courts, and
Queers: Lesbian and Gay Youth in the Juvenile Justice and Foster Care Systems, 6 LAW &
SExUALITY 31, 42-43 & nn.70-71 (1996).
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juvenile delinquency notes, "[w]hen young women 'get caught'
exploring lesbian desire, the social stigma and marginalization
arising from homophobia" may lead them to "troubles with the
juvenile justice system.'84
Parents can also trigger child welfare laws unintentionally. In
another New York case, a family court judge adjudicated a fourteen
year old boy as abused by both his parents based upon his father's"unrelenting torrent of verbal abuse" directed at the child's "sexual
identity," specifically the father's taunts of "'fag,"' "'faggot,"' and"'queer,"' despite the boy's denial of his homosexuality.85 The family
court judge rejected the father's justification of a right to discipline
his child for the boy's 'girlie' behavior" and noted that the courts
must intervene in the parent child relationship, despite the parents'
constitutional rights, because "children have constitutional rights
which must be respected by all, including their parents., 86  As a
result of the court's finding, Shane was removed from his parents
and placed in foster care.
It is arguable whether the foster care system would be more
hospitable to Shane T. than his homophobic father. As one juvenile
rights attorney has commented, there are two things a young person
in the foster care system does not want to be: 'gay and an
arsonist."'88  There are very few placements that are specifically
designed for sexual minority youth, although in recent years there
have been some programs in larger cities such as Los Angeles,
Washington, D.C., Boston, and New York.89 Sexual minority youth
81 Laurie Schaffner, Female Juvenile Delinquency.: Sexual Solutions, Gender Bias, and
Juvenile Justice, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 18 (1998). On the other hand, Schaffner also
suggests that many young women come into contact with the juvenile justice system for
criminal acts because of involvement with an older boyfriend. Id. at 17-18.
85 In re Shane T., 453 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (Fam. Ct. 1982).
86 Id. at 593 (noting the comments of Shane's father, who stated he would be embarrassed
if his son were homosexual).
87 See id. at 594 (detailing the court order, including the remanding of the child to the
Commissioner of Social Services). The court found that Shane's mother was culpable because
she had "failed to protect her son from an ongoing, serious abuse." Id.
88 See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 46 & n.93-94 (quoting Samuel Dulberg, Deputy Attorney
in Charge at the Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society in Bronx, New York). Mr.
Dulberg noted that placing sexual minority youth is difficult, because he knew of no
placements in New York providing programming specifically for gay or lesbian youths in the
family court system. Id. at 47.
89 See Nancy D. Polikoff, Resisting 'Don t Ask, Don t Tell" in the Licensing of Lesbian and
Gay Foster Parents." Why Openness Will Benefit Lesbian and Gay Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
1183, 1189-90 (1997) (stating that cities are places where one would expect to find such
programs); Sullivan, supra note 83, at 58-61 (explaining that California, New York, and
Massachusetts have programs that are "beginning to serve the needs of gay and lesbian
youth" and that these programs should be used as models for other states).
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in foster care have recently become more visible, ° and their struggle
to be heard remains ongoing.9' Often, sexual minority youth
struggle for a safe environment not only in their homes, whether
familial or state, but also in their schools. Many young people have
endured from teachers and classmates treatment similar to the
judicially declared abuse that Shane T. suffered from his father.
Sexual minority students are now attempting to hold educators
legally responsible for the violence perpetrated against them.
In the ground-breaking case of Nabozny v. Podlesny,92 the Seventh
Circuit held that Jamie Nabozny stated a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for discrimination
based upon sex and sexual orientation because of the school
district's failure to enforce its anti-harassment policies.93 Beginning
in the seventh grade, Nabozny's "classmates regularly referred to
him as 'faggot,' and subjected him to various forms of physical
abuse, including striking and spitting on him."94 Despite Nabozny's
complaints to school officials and a temporary reprieve, the violence
continued and intensified, escalating to an incident in a classroom
where Nabozny was pushed to the floor by two students and
subjected to a "mock rape" while twenty other students looked on
and laughed. 95 When Nabozny went to the office of Principal Mary
Podlesny, she told him "that if he was 'going to be so openly gay,' he
should 'expect' such behavior" from other students. 96  Nabozny's
years in the eighth, ninth, and tenth grades were no better,
although his parents repeatedly sought the cooperation of school
90 For example, a recent issue of Foster Care Youth United, a publication of Youth
Communication/New York Center, ran a cover feature entitled Out on the Inside.- Gay Teens
Struggle to Survive in Foster Care, with pieces by transgendered, lesbian, and gay youth.
FOSTER CARE YOUTH UNITED, Jan/Feb. 2000 (on file with Albany Law Review).
91 For instance, sexual minority youth in foster care in New York City were plaintiffs in a
motion to intervene in the lawsuit Marisol v. Giulia, 929 F. Supp. 662, 669, 693 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), aff'd, 218 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2000), which alleged "systemic deficiencies of gross
proportions" in the New York City Administration for Children's Services. Id. at 669. The
court granted class certification to the plaintiffs, defining the class represented as "children
who are or will be in the custody of the New York City Administration for Children's Services
('ACS'), and those children who, while not in the custody of ACS, are or will be at risk of
neglect or abuse and whose status is known or should be known to ACS." Id. at 693.
92 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
93 Id. at 460-61 (concluding a reasonable finder of fact could find the defendants violated
Nabaozny's equal protection rights through sexual orientation or gender discrimination).
Additionally, the court held "the law.., was sufficiently clear to inform the defendants...
that their conduct was unconstitutional." Id.
91 Id. at 451 (noting that the guidance counselor to whom the student first went for help
took action, but was subsequently replaced).
91 Id. (noting the offending students exclaimed that Nabozny should enjoy the mock rape).
96 Id.
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officials.97 Nabozny attempted suicide, ran away, and refused to go
to school until ordered to do so by the State Department of Social
Services.98 After a particularly vicious beating, a school official
again told Nabozny that he deserved such treatment because of his
sexuality.99 Finally, in the eleventh grade, school administrators
told Nabozny and his parents that they were "unwilling to help him"
and that their son should "seek educational opportunities
elsewhere."'' °
Reversing the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the
school district and officials, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was
"impossible to believe that a female lodging a similar complaint [to a
mock rape] would have received the same response."'0 ' The court
further held that the officials were not entitled to qualified
immunity. 102 On remand, a jury found the school district and
officials liable and the case was settled for almost a million
dollars. °3
In addition to constitutional claims, sexual minority students who
are harassed by peers with the tacit approval of school officials can
seek redress under a federal statute known as Title IX.10 4  The
Supreme Court has recently interpreted Title IX as allowing a
private claim for damages against a school district' 5 for peer
harassment if the harassment is "so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the [student's] access" to
educational opportunities and if the school district has acted with
"deliberate indifference" to known harassment. 0 6  Although the
Court was considering a situation of sexual harassment perpetrated
by a male student against a female student, the same standard
should be operative in a situation of same-sex harassment, based on
91 Id. at 451-52 (noting that after each incident the perpetrators were reported to the
principal who promised to take action but failed to do so).
98 Id. at 452.
99 Id. (noting that Nabozny's beating resulted in internal bleeding, from which he collapsed
several weeks later).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 454-55 (noting the court's belief that Nabozny was treated unfairly and
differently because of his gender).
102 Id. at 455-56 (holding that the defendants were not eligible for qualified immunity
because the law requiring equal protection of the genders is clearly established).
103 See Gay Man Wins $900,000 in School-District Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1996, at B14
(noting the suit was the first federal case against a school district for not protecting sexual
minority students, and was settled for $900,000 prior to the jury reaching a verdict on
damages).
104 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-85 (1994).
100 Title IX only applies to school districts that receive federal funds. Id. § 1681.
106 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
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the Court's unanimous decision in Oncale v. Sundowner 0/shore
Services, Inc.,'07 which held that same-sex harassment was within
the purview of Title VII °s Nevertheless, the substantial obstacle of
the deliberate indifference and severe harassment requirements for
students seeking protection from their school districts for peer
violence'0 9 limits the efficacy of Title IX.'"0
Furthermore, remedies for past acts of violence are an
unsatisfying solution. The focus should be on preventing such acts
from occurring. Suggestions for preventing the harassment of
sexual minority students include creating student groups that
support sexual minorities and instituting official diversity,
tolerance, or curricular programs that include sexual minority
issues. However, these solutions have created their own legal
controversies. For example, tremendous contention erupted in the
school system in Salt Lake City, Utah, when students tried to form
a student interest group on sexual minority issues. In 1995, high
107 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
108 Id. at 79. The Court stated,
[M]ale-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed. Title VII prohibits "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" in the "terms"
or "conditions" of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must
extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.
Id. at 79-80 (second alteration in original). For a discussion of Oncale in the context of peer
sexual harassment, pre-Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, see Joan E. Schaffner,
Approaching the New Millennium with Mixed Blessings for Harassed Gay Students, 22 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 159 (1999).
109 One commentator has proposed a model statute that not only addresses the problems
with the "because of sex" language in federal sexual harassment statutes, but also requires
the school district "to take reasonable steps to remedy the harassment" if it "knows or
reasonably should know" of the harassment or abuse. See Amy Lovell, "Other Students
Always Used to Say, Look at the Dykes"' Protecting Students from Peer Sexual Orientation
Harassment, 86 CAL. L. REV. 617, 643-44 (1998) (providing the text of the model statute,
which lists examples of harassment, including "name-calling, references to sexual activity or
practices, 'joke'-telling, and physical assault").
110 A recent lawsuit instituted by Derek Henkle, a student in the Reno, Nevada school
system, who faced a situation similar to that of Jamie Nabozny, does not make any Title IX
claims, but instead argues on the basis of Equal Protection (as in Nabozny), the First
Amendment (based on school officials requiring Henkle to conceal his sexual identity and
failing to protect him when he revealed it), and state law claims of negligence and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See Complaint Henkle v. Gregory, at 2-3,8, available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited January 28, 2001) (alleging the plaintiff was
continually harassed, beaten, and humiliated for several years by his peers, while school
administrators failed to provide him with aid or protection).
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school senior Kelli Peterson met with official disapproval when she
decided to form a gay/straight alliance at East High."'
School officials' desire to ban or otherwise discriminate against a
particular student group can run afoul of the First Amendment." 2
Interpreting the First Amendment in a suit by a conservative
Christian student group, the Supreme Court held that a university
could not deny funding to a student group because it was"'religious.""' 3 Likewise, the Court disapproved of a public school's
denial of access to its facilities by a Christian organization that
wanted to show a family values program."4 Most recently, a
unanimous Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a
university's mandatory student activity fee because the university
allocation was viewpoint neutral." 5 Thus, it is clear that a public
educational institution cannot engage in content or viewpoint-based
restrictions of expression.
In addition to the First Amendment, the Equal Access Act" 6 may
thwart a school district's inclination to ban a particular club.
Congress passed the Equal Access Act in 1984 in response to
disputes regarding religious organizations' access to public school
facilities." 7 The Act provides that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which
receives federal financial assistance and which has a limited
open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a
meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the
"I See Doni Gewirtzman, 'Make Your Own Kind of Music'" Queer Student Groups and the
Iffrst Amendment, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1131, 1132 (1998) (stating that Ms. Peterson's efforts were
met with hostility and the school attempted to minimize her chances of implementing the
group by effectively banning all student groups on campus that were non-curricular in
nature).
112 See John A. Russ IV, Creating a Safe Space for Gay Youth: How the Supreme Court's
Religious Access Cases Can Help Young Gay People Organize at Public Schools, 4 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 545, 552 (1997) (noting that beginning in the 1970s, "gay students at the college
level consistently won First Amendment victories against efforts to deny their organizations
funding, benefits, and recognition").
113 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825, 837 (1995).
114 See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993)
(finding that the school's denial of access to the organization violated the First Amendment
because the school's reasoning for the denial was based solely upon the organization's
religious perspective).
115 See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000). ("When a university
requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in
the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others.").
116 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1994).
117 See S. REP. NO. 98-357, at 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349 (stating
that the purpose of the Equal Access Act was to "clarify and confirm the First Amendment
right[] of... free exercise of religion").
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religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the
speech at such meetings.118
While the initial intent and usage of the Act benefited religious
groups, it is also applicable to sexual minority student groups. 119
Constrained by the First Amendment and the Equal Access Act,
the Salt Lake City school board prohibited all extra-curricular clubs
rather than allow the Gay/Straight Alliance. 2 ° In reaction to the
situation at East High, the Utah legislature passed a statute
requiring school boards to deny access to any organization whose
program or activities involved human sexuality.'2 ' Somewhat
inconsistently, the Utah Administrative Code provides that
educators shall not exclude any student from participating in any
program on the basis of sexual orientation and may not encourage a
student to develop prejudice on this ground.12
118 20 U.S.C. §4071(a). See id. § 4071(b) (defining a 'limited open forum" as being any
public secondary school that grants an opportunity "for one or more noncurriculum related
student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time").
119 For arguments about the efficacy of the Equal Access Act for sexual minority student
groups, see Susan Broberg, Note, Gay/Straight Alliances and Other Controversial Student
Groups.- A New Test for the Equal Access Act, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 87, 116 (discussing
evolving uses of the Equal Access Act for sexual minority students in educational settings,
and stating that, although religious and gay rights groups disagree ideologically, they may
need to work together to protect the constitutional rights of all high school students); Regina
M. Grattan, Note, It's Not Just for Religion Anymore. Expanding the Protections of the Equal
Access Act to Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual High School Students, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577,
578-79 n.8 (1999) (explaining that, although envisioned for the protection of religiously based
student groups, the Act also protects sexual minorities, and noting that Senator Hatfield, one
of the Act's sponsors, conceded during floor debates that sexual minority students would be
protected under the Act).
120 E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1168 (D. Utah
1999). The school board also denied the Rainbow Club, a student group "whose subject
matter was to include the 'impact, contribution and importance of gay, lesbian, bi-sexual and
transgender individuals,"' approval as a 'curriculum-related"' student group. Id. at 1196.
121 The statute states,
The Legislature finds that certain activities, programs, and conduct are so detrimental to
the physical, emotional, psychological, and moral well being of students and faculty, the
maintenance of order and discipline on school premises, and the prevention of any
material and substantial interference with the orderly conduct of a school's educational
activities, that local school boards shall deny access to any student organization or club
whose program or activities would materially and substantially:
(i) encourage criminal or delinquent conduct;
(ii) promote bigotry; or
(iii) involve human sexuality.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-3-419(2)(a) (Supp. 2000). See also Adrianne Goldsmith, Recent
Legislative Developments in Utah Law.- Education.- Limitations Regarding Student Clubs
and Responsibilities ofSchool Employees, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1374, 1377-78 (noting the Utah
legislature reasoned that since Utah laws prohibited all sexual activity outside of marriage, a
student club for gays would be encouraging criminal conduct).
122 The Utah Administrative Code, R686-103.6, entitled "Competent Practice Related to
Students," provides:
An educator shall:
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In the ensuing litigation, the district judge hearing the case
initially denied the motion for a preliminary injunction filed by the
Gay/Straight Alliance. 23 The judge later granted a partial cross-
summary judgment motion on the Equal Access Act claims finding
the school district did violate the Act during one school year, 24 and
in the final judgment, found there was insufficient proof that an
unwritten policy prohibiting 'gay-positive... viewpoints existed. 25
Unsuccessful in their quest to be recognized by the school district,
the students formed two additional clubs, the Rainbow Club, and
the PRISM club.'26 PRISM ("People Recognizing Important Social
Movements") sought to be recognized as an extracurricular club,
linking the club's purpose to East High courses in American
government, history, and sociology. 27 As such, it would be within
the new policy recognizing only clubs related to the curriculum. 28
When the school district denied PRISM's application, the students
sued again. 29 On April 26, 2000, District Judge Tena Campbell
issued a ruling that imposed a preliminary injunction in favor of the
students, holding that the plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood of
succeeding on the merits of the case.1 30 The student group can now
(E) not exclude a student from participating in any program, deny or grant any
benefit to any student on the basis of race, color, creed, sex, national origin, marital
status, political or religious beliefs, physical or mental conditions, family, social, or
cultural background, or sexual orientation, and may not engage in a course of
conduct that would encourage a student to develop a prejudice on these grounds or
any others.
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R686-103-6(E) (2000), available at LEXIS U.A.C. R686-103-6.
123 East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1364 (D. Utah
1998).
124 See East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1197-98 (D.
Utah 1999) (concluding that the school district did maintain a limited open forum under the
Equal Access Act during the 1997-1998 school year and that the Gay/Straight Alliance was
excluded from that forum). The judge further found that the school district subsequently
maintained a closed forum policy and that the Equal Access Act was thus inapplicable after
the 1997-98 school year. Id. at 1197-98.
125 East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:98-CV-193J, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20254, at *6 (D. Utah Nov. 30, 1999).
126 See id. at *3 (discussing whether the denial of the Rainbow club reflected the existence
of an unwritten school policy); see also East High Sch. PRISM Club v. Seidel, 95 F. Supp. 2d
1239, 1243 (D. Utah 2000) (citing the denial of the club's application by the defendant, who
objected to the perceived focus of the club on gay and lesbian issues).
127 See East Hgh Sch. PRISM Club, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (expressly stating that the club
did not advocate a certain sexual ideology but "that all students should have an equal voice
and be treated with equal respect").
128 See id. at 1243.
129 Id. at 1240 (stating that the issue before the court was whether the school district
applied the appropriate standard in its review of the application).
130 Id. at 1251.
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meet, and the school board is reportedly reassessing its denials to
other student groups, including a Women's Studies Club."'
Tolerance and diversity programs have also engendered legal
controversies for students, teachers, and school districts. For
example, Solmitz v. Maine School Administrative District No. 532
resulted from a "Tolerance Day" at a high school and from a history
teacher's invitation to a local lesbian activist to speak about gay and
lesbian issues during the program. 33  The principal and school
superintendent rejected the lesbian speaker as too controversial;
some parents protested the plan for a lesbian speaker, and there
were bomb threats.' 34  As a result, the school board cancelled the
entire "Tolerance Day" program,' 35 a move reminiscent of that of the
Salt Lake City School Board. The history teacher and a student
brought an action in state court, arguing that their First
Amendment rights had been violated. 36  The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine held that the school board had discretion to cancel
the program as a safety measure, carefully noting that the school
board had not simply excluded the lesbian speaker but had
jettisoned the entire "Tolerance Day."'3 7
More difficult First Amendment issues arise when "tolerance" of
sexual minority issues are not relegated to an easily cancelled
separate program, but are instead part of the school's curriculum.
These situations are usually conceptualized as implicating the First
Amendment rights of teachers rather than those of students. 38 For
131 See Heather May, School District to Review Veto q/2 Clubs, SALT LAKE TRIB., April 28,
2000, at B5, available at 2000 WL 3760244 (reporting that the Salt Lake City superintendent
would review at least two other club decisions).
132 495 A.2d 812 (Me. 1985).
133 See id. at 815 (emphasizing the speaker's role as a group representative who would, in
keeping with the purpose of 'Tolerance Day," discuss with students the issue of tolerance as it
extended to her particular minority). The school principal instructed the teacher that "he
should not invite a homosexual to speak at Tolerance Day." Id.
134 See id. at 815-16 (noting that callers threatened to picket the school, to "sabotag[e] ...
the school['s] furnace," and some parents considered keeping their children home from school
that day or attending the symposium as chaperones).
135 Id. at 816, 820 (citing the 'safety, order, and security" of the school as justification for
cancellation of "Tolerance Day").
136 Id. at 815-16.
137 See id. at 818 (clarifying that the school board may choose, even "where first
amendment rights are directly implicated," to take actions that "restrict protected speech" for
the purpose of maintaining order and stability in the classroom). Because the board acted to
"suppress" all of the viewpoints that would have been presented, it could not have targeted
any specific idea. See id. at 820.
138 For a discussion of the First Amendment rights of public school teachers to "teach
tolerance," see Theresa J. Bryant, May We Teach Tolerance? Establishing the Parameters of
Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 579 (1999).
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example, in Boring v. Buncombe County Board ofl Education," the
Fourth Circuit narrowly split in a lawsuit spawned by an advanced
drama class teacher's selection of a play that featured both a lesbian
and an unwed mother-to-be. 4 ° Despite the fact that the drama
students won numerous awards for their production of the play, the
teacher's attempt to comply with school board policies by obtaining
parental permission slips,14 1 the deletion of certain sections of the
play at the state competition, and the teacher's performance
evaluation after the play as 'superior,"' 142  the teacher was
transferred from her assignment teaching advanced drama in high
school to teaching introductory drama in middle school due to'personal conflicts. ''' 43 The teacher sued in state court alleging a
violation of her First Amendment rights, and the defendant school
officials removed the action to federal court.14  The majority of the
closely divided court decided that the drama production was a
curricular decision in which a teacher possesses no First
Amendment rights.4  The court further held that even if a teacher
does have a First Amendment right of expression, school officials
have a "legitimate pedagogical interest" in restricting the teacher's
speech. 46  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 47
139 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (7-6 decision).
140 Id. at 366.
141 The student whose parent complained to school officials about the content of the play
had viewed a scene of the play without his parents' authorization. Boring v. Buncombe
County Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474, 1476 (4th Cir. 1996).
142 Id.
140 Boring, 136 F.3d at 366-67 (noting the principal attributed those personal conflicts to
'actions [Boring] initiated during the course of this school year"').
144 Boring, 98 F.3d at 1476-77. Boring alleged that the school's transfer of her was done
with 'malice toward [her] over the ideas expressed in the play" and as a result of such
oppression, she suffered damages to her reputation that resulted in lost job opportunities. Id.
at 1477.
145 Boring, 136 F.3d at 369-70 (noting that the doctrine of academic freedom has never
been recognized to give teachers control of the public school curricula). The court concluded
that because Boring's dispute with the school was related to the employment relationship, it
did not qualify to receive First Amendment protection. Id. at 369.
146 Id. at 369-70. The "legitimate pedagogical interest" test is derived from Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). For an excellent analysis of the
various opinions in Boring, as well as the split between the analyses in Hazelwood and
Pi'ckering v. Board ofEducation, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), see Kara Lynn Grice, Note, Striking an
Unequal Balance. The Fourth Circuit Holds that Public School Teachers Do Not Have First
Amendment Rights to Set Curricula in Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, 77
N.C. L. REV. 1960 (1999). See also Recent Case, Constitutional Law-fi'rst Amendment-
Fourth Circuit Rules That a Teacher's Selection of School Curriculum Is Not Protected
Speech.-Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, J86 Fd 364 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 119S. Ct. 47 (1998), 112 HARV. L. REV. 982, 985-87 (1998) (critiquing the Boring
decision as overly restrictive of speech).
147 Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 525 U.S. 813 (1998).
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and thus the precise scope of a public school teacher's First
Amendment right to introduce sexual minority material into the
curriculum remains uncertain.
However, more is at issue than the content of the curriculum
alone. Although First Amendment jurisprudence disfavors
viewpoint restrictions on expression, controversial subjects often
engender attempts to mandate the expression of particular
messages. For example, statutes in Arizona and Alabama both
require that discussions about sexual education or sexually
transmitted diseases include the view that "homosexuality" is
unacceptable. 148  Such statutes arguably violate teachers' First
Amendment rights. Moreover, students should have a First
Amendment right not to be subjected to such viewpoints. 149 It seems
contradictory to deem school officials responsible for peer violence
against sexual minority students while permitting the schools to
promulgate an official message of disapproval of sexual minority
youth. Moreover, the ostracism of sexual minority adolescents has
an adverse affect on students, regardless of their ultimate sexual
choices.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF ADULTS IN THE LIVES OF OUR CHILDREN
The conservative rhetoric concerning children fails to consider"our" children: the children of sexual minority parents and the
children who may become lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered
themselves. However, an even broader statement must be made:
that conservative rhetoric and actions against sexual minority
adults harms children. In this brief final section, I would like to
shift the focus away from conservative adults, and towards what
148 The Alabama statute requires that sex education include "[a]n emphasis, in a factual
manner and from a public health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable
to the general public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under the laws of the
state." ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 (8) (1995). The Arizona statute is more prohibitive, stating
that:
no [school] district shall include in its course of study [about AIDS any] instruction
which:
1. Promotes a homosexual life-style.
2. Portrays homosexuality as a positive alternative life-style.
3. Suggests that some methods of sex are safe methods of homosexual sex.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-7169(c) (2000).
149 For an extended argument of a student's right to be free from certain viewpoints, see
Nancy Tenney, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Reality in Public School Curricula.
Untruths about Homosexuality as a Violation of the First Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV.
1599, 1629-33 (1995), dividing a student's freedom of viewpoint into two categories;
specifically, the right to not be compelled to embrace a certain belief and the right to receive
accurate and useful knowledge.
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liberal, progressive adults might do to disclaim the rhetoric and
promote the reality of children and youth today.
Acts of discrimination, intolerance, and violence caused by sexual
minority status, conduct, or beliefs harm children, even when those
acts are not directed at them. In the context of schoolteachers, that
connection is easily perceived. Although apparently not sexual
minorities themselves,15 ° high school teachers such as Mr. Solmitz,
the social studies teacher from Maine and Ms. Boring, the drama
teacher from North Carolina, asserted their own First Amendment
rights to academic freedom in the context of educating young people
about sexual minority issues. 51  Additionally, schoolteachers and
other adults, who are visible sexual minorities, are role models for
younger people.'52  Students will know if a schoolteacher is
terminated for his or her sexuality, and that knowledge will
influence them. Students will also be affected when their teachers
are harassed for their sexual orientations or gender preferences. 53
This role model rationale applies with equal force to foster
150 See Solmitz v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 59, 495 A.2d 812, 815 (Me. 1985) (noting Mr.
Solmitz planned Tolerance Day "in reaction to the tragic drowning of a Bangor homosexual by
three Bangor high school students"); Boring, 136 F.3d at 366 (noting Ms. Boring chose the
play because it 'powerfully depicts the dynamics within a dysfunctional, single-parent
family').
161 Solmitz, 495 A.2d at 815; Boring, 136 F.3d at 366.
152 The role model quality of schoolteachers is, in fact, a reason that conservatives often
give when arguing that sexual minority teachers should be excluded from their profession.
Consider the statement of Senator Ashcroft, a Republican senator from Missouri, in which he
objected to the proposed Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA), which would prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexuality:
in hiring schoolteachers, or camp counselors, or those who deal with young people, you
never just hire a teacher. You are always hiring more than a teacher. You are hiring a
role model. I cannot think of a single teacher in my past who was simply a teacher to me.
Whether he or she liked it or not, that teacher was a role model.
142 CONG. REC. S9986, 9999-10,000 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft). For
an analysis of ENDA's potential effect on public school teachers and further discussion of the
debates, see Anthony E. Varona, Setting the Record Straight- The Effects o the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 1997 on the .F'rst and Fourteenth Amendment Rights o Gay and
Lesbian Public Schoolteachers, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 25, 29 (1998),
rejecting the suggestion "that gay and lesbian people are a bad influence on youth and thus
should be excluded categorically from teaching positions" and emphasizing that this stance
"belies the nature of homosexuality and the... longstanding presence of lesbian and gay
teachers in the nation's schools.
163 For example, in Murray v. Oceanside Uniied School District, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000), the court considered the allegation by high school biology teacher Dawn
Murray that she was subjected to "harassing and obscene graffiti" painted outside her
classroom on several different occasions. Id. at 30-31. The court reversed and remanded the
case back to the trial court to determine whether she stated a claim under the state labor code
using the standards they set out. Id. at 44-45. However, the court declined to state whether
a claim under state labor law was made out at that point of litigation, noting that Murray's
complaint was sufficient under common law as it pertained to the intentional infliction of
emotional distress allegation. Id. at 44.
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parents, 5 4 social workers, '55 Boy Scouts, 5 6 coaches, '57 and all adults
who interact daily with young people. For many sexual minority
youths, the knowledge that sexual minority adults exist and survive
can be life-saving, '58 but adults who form relationships with young
people risk being branded as child molesters.
Discrimination against adult sexual minorities harms the
children for which they care, whatever the sexual or gender identity
154 See Polikoff, supra note 89, at 1184 (explaining that licensing gay foster parents by
state agencies not only provides homes for gay teenagers, but, also, sends "a powerful
message to those youth that it's okay to be gay").
155 One of the few cases involving sexual minority discrimination against social workers is
Brass v. Hoberman, 295 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), in which two men instituted suit after
they had both passed the caseworker exam. Id. at 359-60. The two were refused employment
because the department maintained a policy of disqualifying "homosexuals" from caseworker
positions, although both men denied being homosexuals. See id. at 360, 364 (noting that the
two men maintained there was no evidence to prove they were presently homosexuals or had
ever been in the past). The City of New York had recently repealed its blanket policy against
hiring homosexuals in civil service jobs, but the city retained that policy for positions
involving contact with children. See id. at 361 (noting the defendants "d[id] not contest the
proposition that a blanket policy excluding homosexuals as a class from city employment
would be arbitrary, capricious and hence unconstitutional"); see also Rhonda R. Rivera, Our
Strait-Laced Judges. The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1015, 1044 n.152 (1998-99) (noting that the "New York Civil Service
Commission has also been relatively progressive in recognizing the rights of homosexual
employees"). The Rivera article also mentions that, in Brass, the city eventually entered into
a settlement agreement in which it stated that its policy was not a blanket disqualification for
homosexuals, and that the city would consider each case individually to determine whether
the position fell within a disqualifying category, such as requiring contact with children or
others who may "easily be influenced." Id.
156 As Senator Nickles, a senator from Oklahoma, stated during congressional debate over
ENDA, "I think if some organizations said they did not want to have openly gay or
homosexual people as role models or mentors for young people-Boy Scouts come to mind...
then they should not have to hire them." 142 CONG. REC. S9986-9997 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Nickles). Then-Senator Ashcroft (who was recently appointed to the
position of Attorney General) agreed, stating that boyhood and adolescence "are critical times
when role models are very important. I think Senator Nickles was on target when he said
that we have to be careful of who we have in the Boy Scouts. I commend the sponsors of this
legislation for exempting the Boy Scouts." Id. at S10,000.
157 See, e.g., Holt v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 685 So.2d 501, 504 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(reversing termination of a female basketball coach and teacher where charges of an improper
relationship with a female student were not supported by substantial evidence); Weaver v.
Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that termination of a
volleyball coach who replied "[y]es" when a student asked her if she was "gay" violated the
coach's First Amendment rights).
158 The historian John D'Emilio writes movingly of his research on homosexual activists
Harry Hay, Chuck Rowland, and the Mattachine Society of the 1950s:
love .... barely touches the depth and variety of feeling that I have for them. I was
three years old when they wrote the Mattachine initiation ceremony: "No boy or girl,
approaching the maelstrom of deviation, need make that crossing alone, afraid, and in
the dark ever again." They were talking about me.
JOHN D'EMILIO, Dreams Deferred: The Birth and Betrayal of America s First Gay Liberation
Movement, in MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSITY 17,
54-55 (1992).
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of those children. This occurs not only in the child custody context,
but also in less obvious areas, such as hate crimes and employment
discrimination. Issues of violence and discrimination are usually
theorized as affecting only the victim as an isolated individual, but
many of these people are parents or caretakers of children. If a
sexual minority is a victim of violence, for example, and is also a
parent, that violence affects the child. Likewise, a sexual minority
parent who loses a job because of discrimination has not suffered a
purely individual loss; his or her children have been deprived of
economic support.
Our attempts at legal reform for sexual minority adults thus
affect our children. This includes both the children of sexual
minority parents and the youth who are members of a sexual
minority themselves. Therefore, it is imperative that our legal
reforms not be narrowly directed at a select group of sexual
minority members-what I have elsewhere called the whitest and
brightest among us. Our children are neither predominantly white
nor rich, they may be disabled, and they may not practice their
sexualities as long-term, monogamous, and "traditional" in the ways
our legal reform movements have often presented us. While there
are some sexual minority members who have opined that "gay"
politics and legal reforms should be limited to specific sexual
minority issues, our children cannot afford such a constrained
perspective. Instead, our legal reforms must flow from a broad
conceptualization of justice, including economic and environmental
justice, with attention to those who are marginalized in society.
Perhaps, there is even a bit of self-interest in this: when children
now are powerful adults, adults now who are still alive will be
elderly and perhaps dependent. We can only hope that "our
children" will afford us the justice we have fought for and earned.
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